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Abstract 
This study examines local government revenue in the 2016 fiscal year. The study makes use of local budget allocation 
documents to analyse problems with local public finance from the Department of Local Administration and employs 
data collected from four groups, namely government officials, experts, local politicians, and local government officials. 
This study reveals several findings. First, revenue structure of local government does not reflect self-reliance and fiscal 
autonomy. Instead the revenue of all types of local administrative organizations (LAOs) rely mostly on grants rather 
than on their self-collected revenues. Second, local administration organizations’ revenue between regions is unequal. 
LAOs in the Northeastern region show the lowest revenues per head from all revenue sources, and grant allocation is 
not academic-based. The fact that the Northeastern revenue and tax collection is lower than other regions, and that 
this region is allocated the smallest and fewest grants by the government, is evidence of this. Fourth, finance laws, 
especially regarding local finance, are outdated. There is no specific legislation on the identification of revenue sources 
of local administrative organizations, nor is there legislation on the regulation and practice of seeking new revenue 
sources for these organizations. And fifth, local administrative organizations are incapable of improving the local 
financial system that includes financial management, staff, and taxpayers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Decentralization has been a policy 
promoted in Thailand since 1997. The 
Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2540 (C.E. 
1997) established elements of a 
decentralized system governance and 
required the central government to 
transfer certain powers to local 
governments. One important element of 
decentralization was to empower the 
fiscal capacity of local governments to 
provide public services. However, while 
the intention of fiscal decentralization is 
to promote fiscal autonomy, and promote 
greater self-governance at the local level, 
significant inefficiencies exist in revenue 
resources of local governments.  The share 
of local government revenue relative to 
the total central government revenue is 
still lower than the amount set by law. The 
2nd Determining Plans and Process of 
Decentralization to Local Government 
Organization Act, B.E. 2549 (2006) allows 
local administrative organizations (LAO) 
to earn revenue of at least 25 percent of 
the government's net income. This earning 
implies local governments will receive a 
minimum of 35 percent of growing 
revenue in proportion to the 
government’s net revenue.  
Yet, the revenue of the local 
government organizations remained low 
over the past decade. 
 
Overall, local revenue in Thailand 
increased from around 10 percent of total 
government revenue in 1999 to 29.36 
percent in 2017, with local administrative 
organizations (LAO) receiving 19,108.10 
million USD** (687,891.61 million baht), 
against the central government's net 
income of 65,083.33 million USD 
(2,343,000 million baht) (Table 1). 
Presently, LAOs experience the revenue 
scarcity to carry out such services for 
people. LAOs' solution is to depend on the 
                                                             
**  1 USD = 36 Baht (Rate exchange in 2016) 
government's budget. In 2016, LAOs’ 
revenue reached 1944.44 million USD 
(70,000 million baht) or only 10.7 percent 
of total local revenues (Table 1). The 
growing dependence on the central 
government can negatively influence 
LAOs’ development, meaning that LAOs 
will be hindered in determining their own 
local development strategies. 
Intergovernmental grants play a 
significant role in financing revenue for 
local governments.  Grant revenues are 
intergovernmental transfers, money that 
local government receive from central 
government. Intergovernmental grants 
are dominant revenue for local 
Types of LAO revenue Year 
       
 
2014 % 2015 % 2016 % 2017 % 
1.Local own revenue 1564.06 9.04 1707.16 9.51 1944.44 10.67 3111.11 16.28 
2. Surcharge tax 
revenue 5661.63 32.74 6061.72 33.76 6081.66 33.36 6077.77 31.81 
3. Shared tax revenue 3027.77 17.51 3027.77 16.86 3027.77 16.61 3083.33 16.14 
4. Grant revenue 7041.66 40.71 7157.32 39.86 7174.94 39.36 6835.87 35.77 
Total revenue 17295.14 100 17953.99 100 18228.83 100 19108.10 100 
Government net 
revenue  63194.44 
 
64583.33 
 
64722.22 
 
65083.33 
 Proportion of LAO 
revenue to 
government net 
revenue (Percent) 
 
27.37 
 
27.8 
 
28.16 
 
29.36 
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government. The highest grant was 46 
percent of local revenue in fiscal year 
2001. The amount of grant was 7041 
million USD or 40.71 percent in 2014, and 
declined to 6835 million USD or 35.77 
percent in 2017 (see Table 1). Although 
the proportion of intergovernmental 
transfers has decreased, grants are larger 
percentage of revenue than any other 
local revenue items.  
Public services have encountered 
obstacles to local finance management. 
Increasing local revenue is a significant 
challenge facing the central and local 
governments. Therefore, this paper aims 
to evaluate local finance circumstances by 
analysing the revenue in the fiscal year 
2016 and examining the attempts by LAOs 
in Thailand to achieve greater financial 
autonomy and self-reliance, existing 
financial distribution among regions and 
types of local government organization, 
and local revenue’s problems. 
Additionally, this paper offers 
recommendations to help improve local 
government revenue base, as well as 
public service delivery and local 
development. 
 
Concepts and Theories of Fiscal 
Decentralization  
Fiscal decentralization is the transfer 
of revenue assignment and expenditure 
responsibility to lower levels of 
government. It changes the alignment of 
fiscal authority and expenditure 
assignment to different levels of 
government. In terms of revenue 
assignment, the two major sources for 
financing the expenditure of local 
government are local taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers (Uchimaru 
2012). Local taxes for financing local 
expenditure is key to allowing local 
government to set its own expenditure 
and revenue goals and to ensure it is 
allocated efficiently. Bird and Vaillancourt 
(2006) suggest that there are two basic 
principles for assigning revenue to local 
government. First, local revenue should be 
sufficient to enable at least the richest 
subnational governments to finance all 
locally provided services that primarily 
benefit local residents. Second, to the 
extent possible, subnational revenues 
should be collected only from local 
residents and should preferably be related 
to the benefits they receive from local 
services. Meanwhile Bird (2006) suggests 
that local taxes should clearly impose 
fiscal responsibility at the margin on local 
government by allowing them to establish 
their own tax rates with respect to at least 
some major taxes. However, Martinez-
Vazquez, McLure & Vaillancourt (2006) 
argue that if fiscal decentralization is to be 
reality, local governments must control 
their own sources of revenue. If 
subnational governments lack 
independent sources of revenue, they 
cannot enjoy fiscal autonomy because 
they may be under the financial of central 
government. In terms of 
intergovernmental transfers, the 
intergovernmental transfer is emphasized 
for equity and maintain the national 
standards for public services across the 
country. If local governments lack the less 
capacity to finance services at an adequate 
level, or there are externalities with 
regards to services or regional economic 
disparities, then intergovernmental 
transfers are need to ensure equitable 
services across regions (Bird and 
Vaillancourt, 2006). 
The appropriate budgetary 
empowerment contributes to autonomy of 
local government and the potential for 
decentralization. At least four pillars 
should be considered to ensure successful 
budgetary decentralization. Firstly, fiscal 
autonomy, LAOs should develop their 
revenue collection and budgeting systems 
based on local needs. Fiscal 
decentralization has three components to 
it; revenue, expenditure, and budget 
(Beer-Toth, 2009). Regarding revenue, 
local organizations should fully exercise 
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their power to tax and collect revenue. 
Doing so allows LAOs to gain greater 
spending autonomy and reduce their 
reliance on intergovernmental grants. 
Receiving grants represents continued 
central government control over local 
organization expenditure. In other words, 
LAO fiscal management will reflect the 
government’s requirements and policy 
goals, rather than the needs of local 
people. In terms of expenditure, local 
organizations can design spending 
patterns appropriate to service provision 
and asset management. The expenditure 
autonomy is the right and the ability of 
local government to determine public 
property and funds to meet the demand of 
local constituency, and the freedom to 
decide the how public service shall be 
produced. On budgeting, local 
organizations should plan budgets 
according to the local needs under the 
government's supervision, instead of 
instructions from government on what 
people need. If local revenue is 
insufficient, local governments should be 
authorized to seek loans when 
appropriate.  
Secondly, fiscal self-reliance; LAOs 
should earn sufficient revenue through 
the local tax base to meet local demands 
for public service functions as regulated 
by law. Thirdly, fiscal accountability is 
crucial for all local administration bodies, 
to balance revenue and expenditure while 
equalizing local benefits and financial 
burdens.  
Lastly, fiscal equality is also 
important to ensure that there are neither 
significant fiscal disparities, nor fiscal 
inequalities between LAOs. As for fiscal 
capacity, different local governments have 
various economic bases which effects 
their ability to generate revenue. If the 
horizontal fiscal imbalance situation 
between local governments is not 
improved, it may lead to migration. In 
other words, people migrate out of 
jurisdictions that give them less 
satisfactory public services to places with 
public services that better suit their needs 
(Tiebout 1956). These pillars are 
indispensable to secure LAO's revenue 
sources and autonomy from the central 
government, as well as the overall 
economy and economic development of 
the country. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS  
Government documents and 
interviews with officials were two primary 
sources of data. This study analysed 
documents concerning budget allocation 
to LAOs, including records from the 
Department of Local Administration in the 
fiscal year 2016. Interviews, as part of the 
field research, were conducted with four 
target groups, namely, government staff, 
experts, local politicians, and local 
government staff. Data collection took 
place between November 2016 and March 
2017. 
The paper analyses local revenue 
streams in the Fiscal Year 2016 and finds 
that LAOs received 28.16 % of their total 
income of 656,238 million baht whereas 
the government’s total revenue was 
64,722.22 million USD (Table 1). Thailand 
has 30 city municipalities with 2.7 million 
people, 178 town  
municipalities with 4.5 million people, 
2,233 sub-district municipalities with 16.3 
million people and 5,334 sub-district 
administrative organizations with 35.7 
million people (Table 2). Among revenue 
sources, grants are the primary source of 
revenue for all types of local 
administrative organizations. Self-
collected revenue, such as through 
taxation, accounted for the smallest 
proportion of their total budget. 
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Table 2. Local own revenue, shared tax revenue, grant revenue, total revenue in fiscal year 2016. Unit: 
Million USD. 
 
From their self-collected revenue, 
sub-district administrative organization 
earn approximately 8.75 USD per capita, 
around six times smaller than city 
municipalities. Town municipalities 
receive the highest grant allocation of 
153.36 USD per head (Table 3). The 
lowest allocation 90 USD per head belongs 
to sub-district administrative 
organizations. The comparison between 
revenue per head from all revenue 
sources reveals a massive reliance on 
grants among all types of LAOs. 
 
 
Table 3. Local own revenue, shared tax revenue, grant revenue, total revenue in fiscal year 2016 
Source: Department of Local Administration (2017) 
 
Unit: USD per capita  The 
analysis of LAO revenue in all regions 
indicates that LAOs’ revenue is different 
among the region. In principle, local 
government with smaller sources of 
revenue should receive higher grant 
amounts from the central government to 
ensure services are equal compared to 
other areas regions (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
2006, p 3). However, this does not happen 
in practice. The lowest revenue per 
head—at only 6.25 USD—from all revenue 
sources is in the Northeastern Region of 
country. This revenue is six times smaller 
than the self-collected revenue earned by 
Bangkok vicinities, which earns 79.86 USD 
per head from the shared tax revenue and 
94.25 USD per head from the grant (Table 
4). In addition to their self-collected 
revenue and shared tax revenue of the 
Northeastern Region being lower than 
other regions, this region also has less 
grants allocated to it than others.
Types of LAO N 
Population 
(person) 
Area 
(km²) 
Local 
own 
revenue 
Shared 
tax 
revenue 
Grant 
revenue 
Total 
revenue 
        City municipality 30 2788034 1441.58 168.15 341.08 342.33 851.56 
Town municipality 178 4570818 4654.22 190.95 523.45 600.45 1314.85 
Sub-district municipality 2233 16300000 100724.70 280.19 1551.05 1646.81 3478.05 
Sub-district administrative 
organization 5334 35700000 400190.30 318.90 2734.95 3085.86 6139.70 
Total 7775 59300000 507010.80 958.19 5150.53 5675.45 
11784.16 
 
Types of LAO N 
Population 
(person) 
Local own 
revenue 
Shared tax 
revenue 
Grant 
revenue 
Total 
revenue 
City municipality 30 2788034 60.13 122.05 131.68 313.86 
Town municipality 178 4570818 40.34 121.36 153.37 315.07 
Sub-district municipality 2233 16300000 17.00 110.02 115.16 242.18 
Sub-district administrative 
organization 5334 35700000 8.75 84.86 90.03 183.64 
Total 7775 59300000 12.04 93.06 98.86 203.96 
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Table 4. Local government’s revenue in fiscal year 2016, by region 
                                Unit: USD per capita 
Region N Population Area(km²) 
Local own 
revenue 
Shared tax 
revenue 
Grant 
revenue 
Total 
revenue 
Northeast 2947 21800000 166043 6.27 79.86 94.27 180.40 
North 1676 11800000 166887 8.50 94.21 108.09 210.80 
South 1176 9254431 71867 14.91 93.20 104.47 212.58 
East 575 4743261 36952 26.32 113.79 94.88 235.00 
West 537 3727562 42809 11.43 99.91 95.84 207.18 
Central 554 3010505 16346 18.92 114.75 100.21 233.89 
Bangkok vicinities 310 4968463 6107 37.39 122.80 81.39 241.58 
Total 7775 59300000 507011 12.04 93.06 98.86 203.96 
Source: Department of Local Administration (2017) 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSION 
Law-related Problems and Local 
Revenue 
The laws establishing LAOs also 
prescribe their sources of local revenue. 
These include the Provincial 
Administrative Organization Act, B.E. 2540 
(Section 73), the Municipal Act, B.E. 2496 
(Section 66), and the Sub-district Council 
and Sub-district Administrative 
Organization Act, B.E. 2537 (Section 82); 
the Determining Plans and Process of 
Decentralization Act, as well as other 
specific laws on local revenue sources. The 
Provincial Administrative Organization Act 
and the Municipality Act allow PAO and 
municipality may have their revenue 
resources from 1) taxation as prescribed 
by law 2) fees, license fees and fines 3) 
their own assets 4) their own public 
utilities, 5) their commerce 6) bonds or 
loans 7) loans from ministries, department 
as approved by the Minister 8) subsidies 
from government 9) donations 10) and 
other sources of revenue as provided by 
law to belong to the PAO, belong to 
municipality.  Meanwhile, the Sub-district 
Administrative Organization is also have 
revenue as well as PAO and municipality 
but accept bonds and loans.  
Specific laws supporting local 
revenue sources, as detailed in the law on 
the set-up of LAOs, allow localities to 
collect revenue on their own. The 
mentioned laws embrace the signboard tax 
under the Signboard Tax Act, the local 
development tax under the Local 
Development Tax Act, and the building and 
land tax under the Building and Land Tax 
Act. According to in-depth interviews with 
experts, local politicians, and local 
government officials (2016), the section 
below presents a summary of the 
problems which the laws mentioned above 
produce. 
Amendments to local tax laws rarely 
reflect changing social contexts. Locally 
levied taxes are made possible through 
specific laws. However some of these laws 
have not been amended since their 
enactment decades ago. For instance, the 
Signboard Tax Act, B.E. 2510 for local 
signboard taxation, the Local Development 
Tax Act, B.E. 2508 for local development 
taxation and the Building and Land Tax Act, 
B.E 2475 for building and land taxation 
have remained unchanged. 
New sources of revenue encounter 
obstacles in terms of regulation and 
implementation. For instance, the Council 
of State interprets municipal enterprises 
as an affair in conflict with the law 
prohibiting local organizations from 
operating them, besides limitations over 
investments and profit-making. The 
interpretation changes the enterprise into 
a competitor with private businesses. If 
any LAO plans to operate a counter service 
business to generate revenue, the plan will 
not be achievable. On the other hand, a 
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large LAO can operate an electric power 
plant in the absence of legal permission. 
This evidence shows the foreseen 
impossibility for new creativities of local 
revenue. Local organizations will be at risk 
of violating laws which could result in the 
persecution of their executives. However, 
if strongly insisting on new revenue 
generation, the executives have to strive 
for it, perhaps through formal inquiries to 
all concerned authorities and waiting for 
their delayed answers.    
Most local collected revenues 
assigned by law are narrow-based taxes, 
such as the building and land tax, the local 
development tax, the signboard tax, and 
the animal slaughtering tax. As a 
consequence, the percentage of locally 
collected revenue amounts to the smallest 
revenue source, making just 10 percent of 
LAO total revenue. This significantly 
affects local autonomy. Nationally-imposed 
fixed-rate taxes hinder LAO ability to adapt 
to changes to the economy and prevents 
localities from freely deciding local tax 
items.   
Law enforcement is problematic. By 
law, local tax revenue collection is feasible 
through the use of fines and penalties for 
taxpayers failing to meet their required 
obligations. In practice, however, law 
enforcement treats taxpayers differently. 
An example case concerns the building and 
land tax which, as permitted by law, local 
governments are authorized to enforce 
measures against those failing to file taxes. 
The measures are made up of: issuance of 
warning letters to taxpayers to provide 
statements or submit documents; issuance 
of warning letters to make payment; 
issuance of orders for taxpayers to 
negotiate a deal; and failing that, the 
seizure, attachment or selling properties 
by auction. However, local governments 
find it difficult to enforce the last measure. 
There are no clear implementation 
guidelines and a significant degree of 
complexity. Also, if it is enforced, the local 
leader's electoral base will be negatively 
affected. It is suggested that law 
amendments should be prioritized to 
ensure the effective implementation and 
enforcement of tax liabilities for all 
taxpayers at the local level. 
 
LAO Capacity-related issues and fiscal 
improvements  
Local administration taxation does 
not have a proactive approach. LAOs 
commonly tax by requiring all taxpayers to 
inform them with a list of their assets. The 
Department of Local Administration has 
already introduced a tax and property 
mapping software called LTAX 3000, and a 
GIS application called LTAX GIS. The 
program is aimed at increasing 
convenience, processing speeds, and 
validity for taxation process. At the 
operational level, however, such aims have 
not been met as the mapping process 
depends upon the LAOs workforce, budget, 
and available time. A lack of checking and 
monitoring of taxation is common in 
localities and advanced technologies are 
not used for tax payment services (Local 
government officials, Interview, 2016). The 
technological issues are explained by 
budget insufficiencies in some local areas, 
with most budgets directing funds towards 
other development projects. On the whole, 
local taxation capacity is low. The reason 
for local authorities' loss of interest in 
taxation improvement partially derives 
from the revenue structure that heavily 
relies on tax revenues and 
intergovernmental grants from the 
government.   
Human resources are also a 
challenge. Local staff are needed to build 
effective and efficient taxation capacity of 
LAOs (Local government officials, 
Interview, 2016). Furthermore, LAO 
leaders often believe that it is not in their 
political interest to implement efficient 
taxation schemes. They fear losing their 
electoral support. In fact, some LAOs even 
give land tax exemptions or adopt a low-
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rate tax to maintain their leader's political 
position.  
Taxpayers try to either pay the 
minimum rate of tax or avoid it entirely. 
Many use their political connections to 
receive tax deductions or find gaps in the 
taxation system to avoid paying higher 
taxes. Also, most people appear to 
fundamentally misunderstand the role of 
local government and are, therefore, 
unwilling to pay local taxes.   
 
LAOs’ Budget Allocation Issues: 
Intergovernmental Grants 
The objective of intergovernmental 
grant allocation is to narrow fiscal gaps 
between LAOs and to achieve horizontal 
equality. Decentralization has transferred 
a range of functions and revenues to LAOs. 
But the demands, service delivery costs, 
and revenue-raising capacity vary by 
locality. In many cases, some districts do 
not perform their functions at full capacity 
if they rely on tax-revenue alone, meaning 
that fiscal disparities or gaps are 
inevitable. This is why intergovernmental 
grants are the primary tool to equalize 
fiscal capacity between localities. These 
grants ensure a balance between revenues 
and expenditure, which are assigned to 
local governments, and build fiscal equality 
between localities.  
However, grant allocations that are 
not equitably distributed will run into at 
least three problems (Martinez-Vazquez 
&Boex 2001). Firstly, some LAOs suffer 
revenue inadequacies by attempting to 
perform functions at national-standards. 
Subsequently, different areas may provide 
different standards for the same public 
service. Secondly, horizontal fiscal 
disparities remain unchanged, particularly 
among LAOs with greater fiscal needs and 
smaller budgetary capacity. And lastly, 
intergovernmental transfers cannot act as 
an influential tool in achieving policies at 
national level.  
The Determining Plans and Process of 
Decentralization Act, B.E. 2542 authorizes 
the Decentralization to Local Government 
Organization Committee with decision-
making powers over grant allocation, 
including criteria and objectives for 
distribution. This authorization includes 
the access of standard public services at 
the local level, reducing gaps between 
localities with diversified fiscal status, 
performing specific tasks based on 
government policy, and reaching solutions 
to problems which are beyond a LAO’s 
budgetary capacity. To genuinely 
accomplish the objectives of grant 
allocation, the allocation criteria and 
methods should be designed to prevent 
intergovernmental grants from merely 
being used as a sources of revenue for 
most LAOs, but instead to become a tool to 
achieve fiscal equalization. From 1999 
onwards, the Thai government has 
allocated intergovernmental grants to 
LAOs, making the fiscal status of LAOs 
deeply reliant on financial support from 
the government. Indeed, over 40 percent 
revenue for LAOs comes from 
intergovernmental grants. 
Currently, revenue allocation does 
not achieve the goal of local-government 
fiscal equity. The set of criteria governing 
allocation appears to be simple and 
grounded on population, per-capita and 
area bases. But while, allocation 
adjustment methods exist, obstacles exist. 
For instance, local areas with non-
registered populations create barriers to 
revenue capacity and expenditure for local 
administration and public services. As 
such, allocated grants are not a reliable 
source of revenue for many local 
communities. Allocation criteria, in 
general, are out of touch with current and 
future situations (Academics, Interview, 
2016). 
Inadequate statistics at the local level 
and the lack of coverage of numerous 
indicators hinders effective grant 
allocation. Records and historical data are 
either scarce or not organized in a 
standardized format. Recorded data is 
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often incomplete, dispersed, and 
inconsistent. This is largely due to the fact 
that local governments lack the capacity to 
effectively record data. There are no local 
statistics offices or statisticians in charge 
of the local statistical data system. Local 
data collection is rarely carried out 
because of budgetary, staffing, operational 
or coordination limitations. Data sharing 
among local units is incredibly rare, and it 
is therefore impossible to establish a 
central data hub for search and analysis. 
The final explanation deals with data 
records barely being available in LAOs. In 
some cases, the data does exist at all or is 
inconsistently recorded, perhaps owing to 
occasional requests for particular data 
from the Department of Local 
Administration. 
Uncertainty of allocated grant, grant 
uncertainty makes it difficult for local 
governments to predict exact grant 
amounts. Customarily, intergovernmental 
grants may be decreased due to national 
and global economic conditions. Grant 
allocations may also be constrained by 
new government policy. In 2016-2017, 
grants allocated to LAOs were reduced as 
the government sought to allocate grants 
to village headmen, rather than through 
LAOs. 
The exact sources of grants are not 
assigned by law, and grant allocation 
criteria is modified every year. The 
unpredictable nature of grant allocation 
makes it difficult for LAOs to plan ahead, 
and as a consequence, constrains local 
development plans.  
Delayed allocated grants, this 
pertains to the general grants defined by 
purpose, for example for the provision of 
school milk, childcare facilities, old-age 
allowances, disability living allowances, 
and so forth. The long and slow allocation 
process affects scheduled development 
project activities directed by LAOs, 
frequently forcing them to use their 
reserve finances until the grants are 
received. As a consequence, local 
authorities are required to explain the use 
of the prospective grants to the Office of 
the Auditor General of Thailand. In many 
instances, grants are allocated just before 
the end of the fiscal year, leaving LAOs 
unable to complete their projects on time.   
Specific grants allocated to LAOs have 
been increasing annually. In 2012 alone, 
the grant amount jumped up to 50 percent 
of total intergovernmental grants (Table 
6). By name, the specific grants are meant 
for specific purposes or policies set by the 
government. It is impossible for local 
governments to exercise discretion or 
autonomy for grant utilization. 
General characteristics of this specific 
grant allocation is detailed here. Grant 
allocation is often seen as an outcome of 
political negotiation among various actors, 
such as between local and national 
political players, or between local decision-
makers (Local government officials, 
Interview, 2016, Local Politicians, 
Interview, 2017). Notably, before the 
decision on grant allocation, players on the 
local side often try to gain grants using 
political favours, with good connection 
with politicians and decision makers often 
benefiting local organizations. On the other 
side, the central authority may visit LAOs 
for grant allocation. After talks end with a 
mutual understanding, grants are given to 
LAOs. However, the specific grant 
allocation draws mostly on the negotiation 
over revenue proportion, exchange of 
interest and development projects 
stipulated by the central government, 
rather than local government. 
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Table 6. General and specific grants allocated to local administrative organizations 2006-2017 
        Unit: Million USD  
Fiscal Year General Grants Percent Specific Grants Percent Total grants * 
2006 2740.47 89.50 321.00 10.48 3061.47 
2007 3174.81 92.48 257.81 7.51 3432.61 
2008 3055.47 83.91 585.47 16.08 3640.94 
2009 2891.64 77.34 846.78 22.65 3738.43 
2010 2063.08 59.24 1419.20 39.24 3482.31 
2011 2223.03 48.69 2341.77 51.30 4564.80 
2012 2380.42 41.76 3319.36 58.23 5699.78 
2013 2901.25 47.57 3196.52 52.42 6097.77 
2014 3526.88 53.77 3031.15 46.22 6558.02 
2015 5825.88 87.16 857.49 12.83 6683.38 
2016 5658.26 85.89 929.37 14.10 6587.63 
2017 5759.80 93.15 423.17 6.84 6182.96 
Source: Office of the Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Committee (2009-2017), 
National Municipal League of Thailand (2013) 
*Total grants allocated to provincial administrative organizations, municipalities, and sub-district 
administrative organizations through the Department of Local Administration (excluding Bangkok and 
Pattaya).  
 
The specific grant lies under the 
budget determined by Members of 
Parliament (MPs). This way, MPs elected 
by local people attempts to redeploy 
grants to their own constituency. MPs may 
informally exert their influence or give 
instructions to budget allocation 
authorities to approve the budget for MPs' 
constituencies. The approved budget 
carries a positive relationship with MPs' 
popularity. Positive consequences also can 
fall on election campaigners, who 
successfully make the procurement 
agreements with government 
organizations, such as agreements on 
constructing and dredging canals and 
waterways. 
The use of specific grants are on the 
rise, particularly for policies initiated by 
the central government, leaving many 
LAOs receiving money they can only use 
for specific purposes, and are unable to use 
it for other purposes such as service 
delivery, problem-solving, developments, 
and improvements, or for anything else 
required by the local area. Under the 
government of Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva and 
Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, specific grants 
were given to LAOs to implement policies 
such as the old-age allowance, the 
disability living allowance, the stipend for 
village health volunteers and the children’s 
school lunch grant. 
A serious reassessment of grant 
allocation procedures must be undertaken 
to ensure that it is in-line with local 
functions, authorities, and expenditures, 
and to realize fiscal equity. A reassessment 
should take into consideration the 
development of a local database to support 
allocation criteria for local fiscal balance. 
When considering the specific grant 
utilization, the purpose of usage should be 
made clear and stringent monitoring and 
enforcement should be implemented. 
Without these, corruption and ineffective 
use of resources would arise (Ahmad & 
Craig 1997). Finally, a politically neutral 
organization or a committee on specific 
grant allocation should decide grant 
allocation to avoid political deals.   
 
Problems Concerning Budget Public 
Budget Participation 
Involving local people in local 
budgeting is crucial. By participating in the 
decision-making process, local 
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communities can better express their 
priorities and concerns. Greater 
engagement from the local community can 
also make the process more public and 
accountable. Budgeting can serve public's 
requirements and facilitate monitoring 
and transparency mechanisms for all LAO 
operations. Even so, public budget 
participation remains inadequate, 
especially when it comes to budget 
making. Public participation is limited, 
with little public engagement on the 
problems and needs of development 
projects.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Fiscal decentralization of revenue 
assignment does not reach fiscal 
autonomy. The revenue proportion 
between local government and central 
government is still less than 30 percent of 
total central government revenue. In terms 
of local revenue structure, overall, locally 
collected revenue does not ensure fiscal 
self-reliance and as a consequence LAOs 
lack budgetary autonomy.  Indeed, local 
revenue relies on intergovernmental 
grants for a substantial part of their 
budget. Most local governments are only 
able to generate around 10 percent of their 
total revenue from local revenue 
generation. The problem is in large part 
due to the laws and regulations in place for 
local finance. The content of many of these 
laws is outdated and create ambiguities on 
the assigned revenue sources and the 
prohibition of new revenue sources. 
Moreover, the issue reflect concerns LAO's 
low capacity to improve their fiscal 
administration, human resources and 
ensure full and even taxation 
In addition, grant distribution does 
not support revenue equity among LAOs.  
The less revenue capacity LAO get less 
amount of grants, because of a weak 
allocation criteria and political 
interference, particularly concerning 
specific grant allocation. 
This study recommends that: 1) Grant 
allocation is reformed to lessen fiscal 
disparity between LAOs. The reformation 
is feasible through the academic-based 
calculation formula. This also means more 
grants should be allocated to local 
organizations with smaller revenues. The 
current situation is that LAOs, like 
Northern sub-district administrative 
organizations, which have lower revenues, 
receive smaller grants than other regions' 
local organizations with higher revenues. 
2) Laws on the revenue of LAOs need to be 
revised. The revenue sources for each local 
administrative organization should be 
clearly defined. At the same time, obsolete 
laws should be amended to pave the way 
for organizations to generate new 
revenues. 3) LAOs should find ways to 
better employ technologies, improve staff 
competency and involve local people in the 
LAOs activities in order increase the 
effectiveness of revenue collection and 
revenue use. 
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